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May 2009I foresee that within the next ten or twenty years the now fashionable highly abstract
analysis of conventional economists will lose out. Though its logical base is weak — it
is founded on utterly unrealistic, poorly scrutinised, and rarely even explicitly stated
assumptions — its decline will mainly be an outcome of the tremendous changes
which, with crushing weight, are falling upon us.
— Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish development economist
Introduction: ‘The Terrible Simplifiers’ in Irrelevant Economics
The United Nations recently announced that the number of chronically hun-
gry people on the planet has exceeded the billion mark for the first time. It
is extremely unlikely that any of them will ever hold a Swiss 1,000 franc
banknote (worth more than 900 dollars), but if they did, they would see the
portrait of a man who perceived the essence of the explanation as to why
extreme poverty and extreme plenty coexist so naturally on this planet, and
of the grim fate of the permanently starving — Swiss historian Jacob
Burckhardt (1818-1897). Burckhardt, best known as a historian of the
Italian Renaissance, coined the term ‘the terrible simplifiers’ to describe the
demagogues who — in his dark vision of what the 20
th century would bring
— would play central roles in the future (Dru 2001: 230). Events amply ful-
filled Burckhardt’s predictions of a cataclysmic 20
th century, of the rule of
terrible simplifiers, men who Burckhardt’s colleague at the University of
Basel, Friedrich Nietzsche, called power-maniacs (Gewaltmenschen), and
John Maynard Keynes referred to in 1936 as ‘madmen in authority’. 
A key common element in persistent world poverty and in the financial and
(real) economic crisis is the ‘terrible simplification’ — a theoretical over-
shooting into irrelevant abstractions — that has taken place in economic
theory after World War II. As unlikely as it may initially sound, I shall
endeavour to explain in this paper how — in spite of its apparent sophisti-
cation — equilibrium economics became ‘mathematized demagoguery’
based on an extremely simplistic worldview. Joseph Schumpeter’s solution
to the late 19
th century Methodenstreit (‘battle of methods’) of economics
had pointed in a very different direction, arguing that the profession need-
ed to have theories at different levels of abstraction. According to the prob-
lem posed and the question asked, one should be able to enter the edifice
of economic theory at a level of abstraction where one was likely to find an
answer (Schumpeter 1908). After World War II, economics experienced the
opposite development: only very abstract theory survived. In this process,
the main causes of uneven development as well as the cause of financial
crises were assumed away from the theoretical edifice. The financial crisis
appears to have created a turning point. The July 18, 2009 edition of The
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nomic theory — portrays the crisis in economic theory on its front cover
with a book entitled ‘Modern Economic Theory’ experiencing a meltdown
like an ice-cream abandoned on the beach on a hot summer’s day, with the
subtitle: ‘Where it went wrong — and how the crisis is changing it’.
One element explaining the financial crisis is what Hyman Minsky called
‘destabilizing stability’: long periods of stability lead to increasing vulnera-
bility. This paper argues that similar mechanisms are at work inside eco-
nomics: long periods of economic progress in the core countries lead to
increasingly abstract and irrelevant economic theories (‘terrible simplifica-
tions’). This leads to turning points towards more relevant economic theo-
ries, referred to as ‘1848 moments’. The paper further outlines the key vari-
ables that need to be re-introduced into economic theory in order to furnish
poor countries with the type of productive structures that makes it possi-
ble to eliminate poverty.
Reconstructing Relevant Economics
The epigraph of this paper from Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal dates from
1956. This paper argues that Myrdal was only wrong about the timing. The
process he describes is happening now, because only now — with the
worldwide financial crisis — is it possible to see the basic weaknesses of
standard textbook economics as they relate both to the financial crisis and
to persistent poverty in the Third World.  
In his 1952 book The Counterrevolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse
of Reason, Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992) states
that ‘never will man penetrate deeper into error than when he is continuing
on a road which has led him to great success’. Hayek pictures a process of
scientific decay that grows out of the excesses that follow from the very
success of a particular set of ideas. Twenty-two years later, after having
shared the Nobel Prize with the same Gunnar Myrdal, we find Hayek argu-
ing along the same lines. Had he been consulted whether to establish a
Nobel Prize in economics, Hayek says in his Nobel dinner speech, ‘I should
have decidedly advised against it’. Hayek’s main argument against award-
ing a Nobel Prize in economics was that such a prize ‘would tend to accen-
tuate the swings of scientific fashion’. Economics differs from other sci-
ences, Hayek notes.  
Following Kuhn (1970) the idea of changes in scientific research agendas
— of paradigms — became common knowledge. Science occasionally
makes radical breaks. But economics is different from the hard sciences in
that, through the mechanisms described by Hayek, the paradigm decays by
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ceived and carried out. But, also here economics differs from other sci-
ences. Once it has been understood that the world is not flat, but round,
the idea of a flat earth never comes back. In economics however, the par-
adigmatic overshooting into excesses — as described by Hayek — brings
back theoretical elements that have previously been present but were later
left out.   
The theoretical overshooting, then, is caused by making economics gradu-
ally excessively abstract, which at one point necessarily creates a counter-
reaction. Economics as a science thus oscillates cyclically over time
between very abstract theory, as the theory ruling from the fall of the Berlin
Wall until the 2008 financial crisis, and a less abstract one. A key differ-
ence between the two types of theories is how they relate to empirical
facts. The following quote is typical of the two approaches:
Abstract economic theory: 
‘One of the best things with economics is that it is just a way of 
thinking, factual knowledge is non-existent.’ — Professor Victor
Norman, Dagens Næringsliv, December 31, 1994, p. 21. 
Empirically based economic theory:
‘The root of everything we can call theory is to observe things as
they are.’ — Hans-Georg Gadamer, Lob der Theorie. Reden und
Aufsätze, 1991, p. 43.   
These two different approaches to economics are largely incompatible. For
reasons that shall be explained later, I refer to the point when the over-
shooting in level of abstraction — the moment when abstract economic the-
ory yields by necessity to a more empirical theory — as ‘the 1848 moment’.  
Algerian-born philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) contributes to
explaining the overshooting phenomenon. Every structure — be it literary,
psychological, social, economic, political or religious — that organizes our
experience is constituted and maintained through acts of exclusion, Derrida
says. We cannot include all possible factors in a theory, but if we exclude
too much — if theory gets too abstract and overshoot — what we have left
out will come back and haunt us. Abstract structures can become repres-
sive. Derrida insists that what is repressed does not disappear but always
returns to unsettle every construction, no matter how secure it seems. Both
the financial crisis and persistent poverty in many Third World nations are
the result of leaving out of economic theory important empirical phenome-
na that were not well captured by the increasingly abstract models that
became standard textbook economics. And as the theories attempted to
include more complicating factors, like increasing returns, we shall see that
4this was done in a way that obliterates the structural differences between
countries. Complexity was added, but not diversity. As events that cannot
happen in theory, only in practice — like financial crises and persistent Third
World poverty under a free trade regime — come back haunting the eco-
nomics profession, the profession is forced to lower its level of abstraction.
This happened during the French Revolution, after 1848, after 1929, and
is happening again in 2009.    
The 2008 financial crisis and the failure to eradicate poverty in the Third
World are both results from the kind of overshooting — political and ideo-
logical — explained by Hayek. The financial crisis and persistent poverty, I
argue, are both the result of a theory that got too abstract and became fas-
cinated with tools and methods that failed to take into account extremely
important aspects of economic reality. After the financial crisis everyone
says ‘We are all Keynesians now’. Both in the case of the financial crisis
and in terms of advice to poor countries in the economic periphery it is time
to resurrect the thinking of John Maynard Keynes.
Financial crises make it clear that markets, if left to themselves without
regulation, do not produce economic harmony. Harmony is the result of
wise regulations. Such crises also open people’s eyes to the fact that the
same principle of potential market-made disharmony also applies to the mar-
kets for goods and services. Also there economic harmony is a result of
wise regulations. After the 1847 financial crisis John Stuart Mill recanted
on David Ricardo’s trade theory, and John Maynard Keynes tells us in his
own words how he changed his mind about the same free trade theory —
which in the meantime had come back in fashion — around the time of the
1929 crisis. Both Mill and Keynes saw that poor countries need an increas-
ing returns sector
ii, i.e., an industrial sector, in order to become wealthy.
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ii  Activities subject to increasing returns are those where production costs fall as the volume of pro-
duction is increased. These lower costs for established firms form important barriers to entry for
newcomers, and produce a  type of competition — imperfect competition — that forms the basis
for extra income, for a ‘rent’, that is shared between capital (profits), workers (in the form of high-
er wages), and government (in the form of higher taxable income) in industrial countries. I argue that
what we call ‘development’ to a large extent consists in establishing such ‘industrial rents’.
Resource-based activities, on the other hand, always have one factor of production (land, ore, etc.)
limited by nature, and are therefore subject to diminishing returns. Costs cannot be lowered beyond
a certain point because inputs are only available in poorer quality: lower quality land, lower grade
ore, etc. The low barriers to entry in the production of raw materials lead to ‘perfect competition’ or
‘commodity competition’, and the shared national rents that can be created in increasing returns
activities are impossible to create in a country where only resource-based activities are present. Later
in this paper we shall see how the Washington Consensus policies ruined the industrial rents in poor
countries, thereby in many cases lowering the real wages by more than 50 per cent (see Reinert
2004, 2007, and 2009a for further discussions). The ‘normal’ case in economic textbooks is ‘per-
fect competition’ and ‘diminishing returns’. In a sense, the Washington Consensus policies suc-
ceeded in making poor countries look more like the ideals of standard textbook economics, but this
made these countries much poorer than they would have been with an industrial rent.A financial crisis in 1847 triggered a dramatic shift in economics — as we
shall see both right, left, and centre — starting in 1848. ‘If you went to
sleep in 1846 and woke in 1850 you would wake into a different world’
wrote an English university professor in his memoirs (Reeves 2007: 202).
This paper argues that we are now facing a very similar situation: an ‘1848
Moment’ when the economy is seen in a new light, less abstract and more
based on empirical observations.  
1. Economics Abstracting from Production: The Common Element in
Financial Crises and Persistent Poverty   
What unites the failure to understand that a financial crisis was coming and
persistent poverty in the Third World is an economic theory which is pitched
at a level of abstraction where production is left out; a theory where the
world economy is seen as stock markets and freight terminals. In reality
markets and trade are merely superficial manifestations of an incredibly
complex global system of production, and by focusing on the stock
exchanges and trade the complexities of the world production system have
essentially been left out of economic theory.  
The roots of this problem go far back in the history of economic thought,
back to when Adam Smith bundled production and trade together as ‘labour
hours’. Based on this view, David Ricardo — and especially his later fol-
lowers — produced a theory of international trade where the world econo-
my is represented by the bartering of labour hours. When laying the foun-
dations for present mainstream textbook economics David Ricardo also for-
got to create ‘money’ as a separate category. Placing economic theory at
this very high level of abstraction created blind spots on the collective reti-
na of economists, and created an illusion of markets as a harmony-produc-
ing machinery. 
This illusion of harmony-producing markets has been even more destructive
to poor countries in the world periphery than it has been to world financial
markets, and huge rescue operations — paralleling those made in the finan-
cial markets — should be launched to rebuild the productive sectors in poor
countries. The blind spots and the faulty reasoning behind the profession’s
misreading of both problems — financial crises and persistent poverty —
are closely related. Therefore the same economists (e.g., Keynes) who
understand financial crises also tend to understand why mainstream eco-
nomics fails to be able to correct persistent poverty in the periphery.
Several core failures of current academic economics are common to the
financial crises and persistent poverty in the world periphery:
61) Not separating the sphere of money, the financial economy
(Schumpeter’s  Rechenpfennige or ‘accounting units’), from the
real world of goods and services (Schumpeter’s Güterwelt). Not
distinguishing between the two spheres of the economy, neoclas-
sical economists (as opposed to traditional continental European
economists) were blind to the possibility of a financial crisis. For
the same reason, neoclassical development economics attempted 
to solve the problems of poverty by transferring capital rather than 
by addressing the problems of the productive sectors in poor coun-
tries.
2) Not keeping an eye on the nations’ productive structure as its
economic core, focusing on finance rather than on the impact of
finance in the real economy. In normal times the financial sector 
serves as scaffolding for the real economy. Financial crises begin
when the financial sector starts making money in ways that do not 
help the real economy, when banks enter into loan agreements 
that are so risky that the borrowers are not even able to pay the
interests on the their loans — Ponzi financing (Minsky 1990).
Unsustainable financial pyramid schemes fill up the financial mar-
kets with ‘toxic assets’, liquidity is withdrawn, and the financial 
crisis is a fact. 
3) Not seeing that a functional capitalism requires investments to be
made in potentially profitable ventures, not in Ponzi schemes. 
From this point of view subprime lending and, to a large extent, 
lending to the Third World, were both Ponzi schemes: loans made
to people and nations that could not reasonably be expected to 
have a cash-flow that would cover even the interest rates on the 
loans they were given (Kregel 2004). Here Kregel makes an 
exceedingly important point: The Myrdalian ‘perverse backwash-
es’ — that more funds tend to flow from the poor countries to the 
rich rather than, as would be expected, the other way around 
(Myrdal 1956) — can be explained by the same Minsky mecha-
nisms that explain the current financial crisis. The present lack of 
industrial policies in poor countries makes it impossible to achieve
sufficient industrial rents to make investments profitable (see
Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz [eds.] 2009).
As already mentioned, the three failures may be tracked back to the eco-
nomics of David Ricardo and his exceedingly loyal followers. His theory
made the blind spots of present economics possible: a) by failing to create
money as a separate category apart from ‘the economy’, and b) by con-
ceiving of world trade as a bargaining of labour hours — where a labour
hour in Stone Age technology has the same market value as a labour hour
in Silicon Valley — made it impossible to see that some nations specialize
according to their comparative advantage in being poor (Reinert 2007).
72. The Challenge: Relearning the Art of Creating Middle Income
Countries 
Until I was 19 years old there was a country called Korea that was poorer
than Somalia. Figure 1 shows how Korea at that point started an impres-
sive growth spurt while Somalia, if anything, got gradually poorer. My con-
tention is that this happened because Korea consciously changed its com-
parative advantage in international trade from products subject to diminish-
ing returns (raw materials) to increasing returns (manufactured goods and
advanced services). Korea in this way escaped from the poverty trap
explained in Frank Graham’s classical 1923 article ‘Some Aspects of
Protection Further Considered’ (see Appendix 1).  
One of the largest puzzles in the world economy is why there are so few
middle income countries. Why do countries tend to cluster in two conver-
gence groups, developed and ‘underdeveloped’? Why is it so difficult to cre-
ate nations that are half way between Somalia and Korea on Figure 1? 
Figure 1: Comparing Economic Development in Somalia and Korea.
Source: Reinert, Amaïzo & Kattel, 2009.
This paper argues that our inability to create middle income countries is a
result of ‘theoretical overshooting’ in the sense described by Hayek, and
that the policy recommendations resulting from this theoretical overshoot-
ing have made the creation of new middle income countries virtually impos-
sible. A middle income nation is a nation with an increasing returns (indus-
trial) sector which, for a while, is not yet competitive on world markets. The
instant shock opening to free trade called ‘globalization’ should supposedly
8even out world incomes. WTO’s first Secretary General, Renato Ruggieri,
declared that we should unleash ‘the borderless economy’s potential to
equalise relations between countries and regions’. Instead this process
ended up killing the incipient industrial sectors in poor countries, lowering
real wages. The belief that the market, if left to itself, is as a harmony-pro-
ducing mechanism was at the core of the Washington Consensus ideology
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By generally
assuming full employment in their economic models, the Washington insti-
tutions also assumed away the main problem in the world’s poorest
nations: unemployment and underemployment, i.e. the lack of ‘real jobs’. In
many parts of the globe, the result has been a shambles. 
3. Financial Crises as a Result of Overshooting Success
Since the first international financial crisis in 1720 — simultaneously hitting
in Amsterdam, Paris and London — overshooting previous successes has
been a key element (Het Groote Tafereel 1720, Cole 1949). An important
element in financial crises is financial innovations which, in and by them-
selves are useful and legitimate, but gradually become a speculative vehi-
cle carrying to extremes which with hindsight prove to be folly (Mackay
1841). Markets tend to perceive that normal economic gravity has ceased
to exist due to the new financial innovations. In 1720 the new financial
instrument was common stock, in the 2008 crack it was derivatives and
securitized debt. Our latest crack was made possible by abolishing previous
wise legislation (the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act). Banks stopped performing
their traditional role in the economy — evaluating risk that they kept on their
balance sheets. The risks that should normally be carried inside the finan-
cial institutions themselves were passed on to the system and to society at
large (Kregel 2004).
The 1720 crack also represented an overshooting in previously successful
colonial ventures. Spain’s colonies had produced a funnel of gold and silver.
Now France was planning to find the same wealth in a colonial scheme on
the Mississippi, and England did the same in the South Seas. These became
the famous Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. Following a strategy that
had previously led to success led to disaster.
Carlota Perez (2002) argues that major booms and busts always result from
overshooting the real success of fundamental technological breakthroughs
on to projects that are obviously no winners. When US Leather wished to
be valued as US Steel, and when Parmalat tried to do to milk or ENRON to
energy what Bill Gates had done to computing, and the markets are willing
to believe the story, the road to fraud is short.
9Hyman Minsky’s ‘destabilizing stability’ (Minsky 1990, Kregel 2004)
describes how long periods of stability lead to easier credit until a Ponzi
scheme — a fraudulent scheme where the borrowers are not even able to
cover interest payments (as the subprime loans) — leads to the collapse of
the whole financial sector. Previous ‘overshooting’ theories of financial
crises have been produced by Clèment Juglar (1819-1905) who, like
Minsky, emphasized the oversupply of increasingly risky credit. Mikhail
Tugan-Baranovsky (1865-1919) emphasized the role of overinvestments,
the other side of which becomes underconsumption, the angle from which
J.A. Hobson (1858-1940) approached the problem. What these theories all
have in common is that crises are a result of what Hayek calls ‘continuing
on a road which has led … to great success’.  
4. Increasing Distance = Increasing Abstraction
As already quoted, Derrida insists that what is excluded, comes back to
haunt the theoretical structure. What is now haunting trade theory and the
global economy is the repression of the fact that from the point of view of
creating economic growth, economic activities are qualitatively very differ-
ent. At the core of the problem of today’s world economic order lies David
Ricardo’s trade theory which is based on the barter of labour hours that are
void of any qualities. This seems to suggest that free trade between African
autarchic farmers and Silicon Valley will produce economic harmony or ‘fac-
tor-price equalization’, or, at least, benefit both trading partners, as the WTO
director indicates. The risk of nations specializing in being poor is ignored.
In general we can observe that the level of abstraction used in approaching
economic issues increases with the distance to the problem. We could call
this the Increasing distance = Increasing Abstraction Theorem. Questions
close to home are solved through common sense ‘historical approach’,
while problems far away from home are solved applying very abstract prin-
ciples, like Ricardo’s hour-bartering trade theory. Most of us intuitively
understand that if we put all New York lawyers in one nation and all peo-
ple making a living washing dishes in New York restaurants in another, we
shall have one rich nation of lawyers and a poor nation of dish-washing
people. This intuition, however, cannot be translated into standard trade
theory because it violates Ricardo’s core assumption that labour hours are
considered as being qualitatively alike. As Norwegian-American economist
Thorstein Veblen put it: ‘Education may contaminate the instincts’. 
No economists tell their teenage children ‘my daughter, you are so skilled
in washing dishes that you should specialize in your comparative advantage
in washing dishes in restaurants’. Based on common sense economists
advice their children based on the assumption that economic activities are
10qualitatively different as generators of wealth. When the distance to the
issue grows, when it comes to advising Africa, economists’ recommenda-
tions are based on Ricardian trade theory where there are no qualitative dif-
ferences between an hour of lawyers’ work and an hour of washing dish-
es. At best there is an implicit assumption that ‘capital’ can be added and
upgrade people washing dishes into making as much money as lawyers.
Which of course is not the case. 
Paul Krugman made an interesting observation confirming this ‘increasing
distance = increasing abstraction’ theorem. At the time when the United
States insisted on Ricardian trade theory and standard textbook economics
as the foundation of the world economic order, Krugman complains that US
trade policy fails to follow the principles of Ricardian trade theory: ‘the view
of trade as a quasi-military competition is the conventional wisdom among
policy-makers, business leaders, and influential intellectuals.… It is not just
that economics have lost control of the discourse; the kind of ideas that are
offered in a standard economics textbook do not enter into that discourse
at all…’ (Krugman quoted in Reder 1999: 6).
Krugman himself falls victim to the increasing distance = increasing
abstraction theorem. He defends Canadian protectionist policies: ‘it seems
reasonable to argue that Canada’s nationalistic economic policies were the
key factor in creating this (industrial) strength’ (Krugman 1993: 92). Based
on his knowledge of US neighbour Canada, Krugman recognizes the role of
infant industry protection, but surprisingly goes out of his way to show that
the Canadian case — the only empirical case he uses — is different to that
of other periphery nations. I find it very difficult to understand why
Krugman does not make recommendations of this kind also to other laggard
countries, but seemingly the ‘common sense close to home, abstract theo-
ries further away’ mechanism has been at work. 
For this same reason we can observe domestic changes in the hegemonic
countries before they are applied in the rest of the world. During the 1991
minimum wage debate in the United States virtually all economists violent-
ly opposed tampering with the labour market. The market should determine
the wages. When the same debate took place again in 2007, virtually all
US economists supported an increase in minimum wages. Paul Samuelson,
the father of modern trade theory, withdrew his across the board recom-
mendation of free trade when free trade started causing poverty in the
United States (Samuelson 2004). That markets, left to themselves, can
increase poverty not only in the United States, but also in the Third World,
will soon be generally acknowledged.
A further example of the increasing distance = increasing abstraction theo-
rem is the way neo-Schumpeterian economics — placing innovation rather
11than equilibrium at the core of economics — has had growing influence in
the developed world, e.g., in Europe’s Lisbon Strategy, but so far has had
very little impact on Third World policies.
iii After initial ground-work (Nelson
and Winter 1982; Dosi et al.1988), the OECD dedicated a whole research
program (TEP, Technology and Economy) to this approach in the early
1990s. So far the tendency has been to focus on innovation in rich coun-
tries but to leave poor countries with their ‘comparative advantage’, which
may be in activities bereft of any possibilities for innovation (Reinert 2007).
A new volume on industrial policy written in a neo-Schumpeterian frame-
work (Cimoli, Dosi  and Stiglitz [eds.] 2009) is likely to initiate a phase of
innovation-based theories of poverty eradication in the Third World. This line
of investigation is bringing back important elements of classical development
economics, associated with Albert Hirschman, Ragnar Nurkse, Gunnar
Myrdal and others (see Nurkse 2009 and Kattel, Kregel, and Reinert 2009).  
It is important to understand, then, that intellectuals may have ‘modes’ of
thought that operate on very different levels of abstraction. Krugman is an
interesting example of how different these modes can be. In his piece ‘How
I work’, Krugman, the Nobel Prize winner, says: ‘A minor regret is that I
have never engaged in really serious empirical work. It’s not that I dislike
facts or real numbers. Indeed, I find light empirical work in the form of
tables, charts, and perhaps a few regressions quite congenial…. Every year
I promise to try to do some real empirical work. Next year I really will!’ In
Harold Innis’ terms, this is the Krugman who writes in ‘Latin’, in this case,
science virtually void of categories and experience. 
Another very different Paul Krugman exists, however: the one who writes
extremely insightful and heavily empirically-based columns in the New York
Times, founded on a wealth of ‘vernacular’ knowledge and with strong eth-
ical views. If the ‘vernacular’ Krugman would just be as well informed and
interested in Africa’s productive structure as he is in US health care reform,
I am convinced the result would be very good. Unfortunately, so far, the
empirical and well informed Krugman is reserved for issues regarding the
United State: increasing distance = increasing abstraction and simplicity.
‘Simplify, simplify’ is one of the important rules Krugman the Nobel econo-
mist has set for himself in ‘How I work’. In his New York Times columns,
he is doing the opposite, and with very good results.    
Using the terminology of Francis Bacon (1561-1623), mainstream eco-
nomics at this time represents ‘degenerate learning’, rather than ‘good and
solid knowledge’: 
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iii Reinert (2004) represents an attempt to do so. Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid, do
putrefy and corrupt into worms; so it is the propriety of good and 
solid knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle, 
idle, unwholesome and, as I may term them, vermiculite ques-
tions, which have indeed a kind of quickness, and life of spirit, but 
no soundness of matter, or goodness of quality. This kind of
degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen
iv
who, having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and 
small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells 
of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator), as their persons 
were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and know-
ing little history, either of nature or time, did, out of no great quan-
tity of matter, and infinite agitation of wit, spin out unto us those 
laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the 
wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the con-
templation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the 
stuff, and is limited thereby: but if it work upon itself, as the spi-
der worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed 
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and
work, but of no substance or profit (quoted in Reinert 2000).
What happens during 1848-moments — such as we are in now — is that
the abstract models are increasingly seen as irrelevant, and economic the-
ory returns to be more friendly towards empirical facts. Far away countries
start to be treated with the same empirically based knowledge which nor-
mally is only used close to home.   
5. The Failure of Neoliberalist Development Policy
Until the mid-1970s development economics was based on the notion that
a middle-income country is a country with the same type of economic struc-
ture — a large manufacturing sector — as that of a rich country. It was
understood that for a variety of reasons — among them market size, tech-
nological sophistication, relative high price of capital relative to labour, etc.
— the industrial sector of a poor country would need a lot of time before it
was strong enough to face competition from wealthier countries. This peri-
od of ‘infant industry protection’ — as John Stuart Mill called it — is com-
parable to the many years amazon.com operated its business at great loss-
es. Slowly industrializing a nation represents the same kind of trade-off
between present costs and even greater profits (e.g., wages) in the future.
In the meantime the poor country would earn its scarce foreign exchange
from the export of commodities. For developing countries income from cus-
toms duties tended to provide a large share of government income, and
13
iv The reference is to Scholasticism.14
because ports were relatively easy to control even weak governments could
secure this revenue (compared to, e.g., introducing a value added tax).    
If China and India are separated from the rest of the developing world, the
development record over the last 35 years has been very poor in all poor
countries with the exception of the rest of Asia. China and India have based
their national development on continuing the industrialization policy
v that
was started around 1950 (Nayyar 2007). In no way can these countries be
counted as showcases of the neo-liberal policies propagated by the
Washington Consensus, they are — to the contrary — textbook cases of
following the development of Friedrich List (1841) that industrialized
Continental Europe and the United States: industrializing and then slowly
opening up their borders. China and India may have allowed too little com-
petition for too long, and may have opened up too late, but these are small
errors compared to the errors made by the Washington Consensus dein-
dustrialization of so many small countries in the world periphery.
The term creative destruction, inspired by the work of Joseph Schumpeter,
has grown increasingly popular, and is sometimes used to justify any kind of
change. We have previously argued that the term creative destruction entered
economics via Friedrich Nietzsche and Werner Sombart, and that the eminent
Renaissance historian Jacob Burckhardt warned Nietzsche — and us — about
the existence of destructive destruction: ‘There are (or at any rate there seem
to be) absolutely destructive forces under whose hoofs no grass grows’
(Reinert and Reinert 2006). Destruction and creativity may take place in
entirely different parts of the globe, as when the textile mills of Manchester
replaced the weavers of Bengal during the First Industrial Revolution. This
paper argues that globalization — in the sense of a free trade shock — divid-
ed the Third World in two groups: 1) Those — like India and China — that
had followed an industrialization policy for more than 50 years — benefitted
from opening up to the world market, and 2) In those countries whose indus-
trialization was too weak to survive, the synergies of industrialization were put
in reverse, and the economies became primitivized (Reinert 2007: Ch 5).   
Early economic writers repeated again and again that all wealthy nations
had an important thing in common: a large number of different manufac-
turing industries that were all subject to increasing returns (Reinert 2009a).
It had been common knowledge already from the 1400s that a wealthy city
was created by a ‘common weal’, a ben commune. The first author to pin-
point increasing returns and a diversified manufacturing sector as being the
v I am here referring to their domestic industrialization policy since around 1950, not their special-
ization in international trade much later. key to wealth was an Italian economist, Antonio Serra, who in 1613
explained why Venice, virtually void of natural resources, was so rich, while
his own country, Naples, rich in natural resources, was so poor. Without
increasing returns, no capitalism, a very limited division of labour, and no
high wages. In this perspective, colonialism can be seen as a technology
policy set up to prevent increasing returns activities from being established
in the colonies (Reinert 2007). 
Only with Antonio Serra’s 1613 treatise it was understood that at the core
of the wealth-producing mechanisms was increasing returns in each of
these many different activities. Maximizing the division of labour was at the
core of any policy of ‘good government’ (Serra 2009). A large number of
activities subject to increasing returns was the key to national wealth, and
— most importantly — middle income nations were nations where the same
type of activities and the same large division of labour were present, but in
a system slightly less efficient than those of the world leaders. A slightly
less efficient manufacturing and service nation was much wealthier than
the most efficient producer of raw materials (subject to diminishing returns).
To make a comparison appealing to the readers’ intuition: it is much better
to be a mediocre lawyer than to be the world’s most efficient cotton-pick-
er. This is the principle upon which all successful industrial policy has been
built from Henry VII came to power in England in 1485 until the post WW
II Marshall Plan in Europe, and was continued under classical development
economics. It was only unlearned with the Washington Consensus. The
rest of this section shows the mechanisms with which the Washington
Consensus policies primitivized the world periphery. 
Figure 2 shows how rates of economic development improved and peaked
at the height of classical development economics in the mid1970s. Only
Asia, with its long tradition of industrial policy, managed to keep up the pos-
itive trend. By using GDP data rather than real wages, Figure 2 shows the
situation from the best possible angle.
15Figure 2. Growth rate of GDP per capita of selected world regions; regional average in
selected periods between 1820 and 2001; annual average compound growth rate.
Source: Kattel, Kregel, and Reinert (2009). Original data from Maddisson 2003.
Figure 2 shows the dismal performance of neoliberal development policies
that came into effect in the mid-1970s when financial crises in the Third
World were only solved by forcing poor countries to open up for free trade
abruptly. In fact the price paid for being saved by the IMF and the World
Bank was deindustrializaion. Detailed case studies show how this process
evolved in two countries, Mongolia and Peru (Reinert 2004; Roca and
Simabuko 2004). 
The dismal results from neo-liberal development policy can be explained as
a result of the cumulative effect of a number of vices producing theories at
excessive levels of abstraction, and therefore, of irrelevance. The first vice
is what Schumpeter referred to as the Ricardian Vice, that is, the habit of
piling a heavy load of strong policy recommendations upon very shaky
assumptions. This problem got reinforced when Milton Friedman in a 1953
book said: ‘Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have
‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate , and, in general, the more signifi-
cant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions’.
vi Friedman estab-
lished a negative relationship between science and reality, and helped cre-
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This we could refer to as the Friedmanian Vice. A third vice is what I have
dubbed the Krugmanian Vice, the production of theoretical models that
explain the real world better than Ricardo did — but not applying them to
actual economic policy (Reinert 2007). Together these vices combine to
create and maintain the blind spots of economic theory that have prevent-
ed the profession from seeing both financial crises and persistent poverty. 
6. Increasing Returns as the Key to Wealthy Nations  
Persistent poverty in the Third World is a result of trade policy overshoot-
ing. For more than 500 years it has been recognized that middle income
nations have the same type of economic structure as rich nations, but
slightly less efficient. Therefore all presently rich countries have been
through a period of ‘emulation’ — copying the structure of rich countries —
before embarking on a strategy of specializing according to a comparative
advantage (Reinert 2007, 2009b).  
Economic theory has emphasised ‘capital’ and ‘trade’, seriously neglecting
the role of a nation’s productive structure, of technology, of entrepreneur-
ship and of unemployment. The Washington Institutions have got away
with models generally assuming full employment when lack of employment
has been at the core of the problem of poverty. The more abstract the the-
oretical model in a social science, the more facts are excluded. 
6.5 Billion human beings share this planet. If we assume they are all very
different it will be difficult to theorize with any reasonable degree of accu-
racy. If we assume that they are all alike, we can produce a very abstract
and accurate theory. However, if we divide human beings into only two cat-
egories, men and women, there are many meaningful things we can say
about human society, e.g., as regards procreation. If we add age groups
there are even more things we can understand. 
The same thing applies to international trade theory. By modeling the glob-
al economy as a system wherein nations barter labour hours, David Ricardo
implicitly made all economic activities qualitatively alike. He made no effort
to discuss that they could be different. If we split human labour into only
two different categories — those who work under diminishing returns and
those who work under increasing returns — we can to a large extent
explain what separates poor countries from rich. Rich countries have a large
increasing returns sector, poor nations have a very small one, characteristi-
cally below 6 per cent of GDP (Reinert, Kattel, and Amaïzo 2009).
17Increasing returns means that, as volume of production increases, fixed
costs per unit of production fall. If it cost Microsoft 500 million dollars to
develop Windows Vista, that would be the cost of the first copy. If two
copies were sold, the unit cost would be 250 million dollars. But since
copies can be distributed at extremely low costs, fractions of a dollar, on
the web, unit price comes down very fast. The fact that the initial invest-
ment is so high makes it very difficult to compete with Microsoft. The high
initial investment produces high ‘barriers to entry’ into many industries. The
same barriers to entry protect profitability, but can also lead an industry —
the airline industry is one example — into periods when all lose money. The
high investments also create barriers to exit.
Importantly increasing returns invalidate the core assumption of standard
economics: perfect competition. The higher the degree of increasing returns,
the larger the barriers to entry and the more imperfect the competition. It is
behind these barriers that rich countries have managed to elevate their wage
levels. Because of these barriers to entry labour unions, by demanding a
larger share of the pie, actually created a larger pie. As long as all manu-
facturers in the same labour market were subject to the same wage
demands, they could all yield to the demands without going bankrupt. Their
competitors had to yield to the same demands. Higher wages increased the
relative price of labour, which again made mechanization increasingly more
profitable. This spiral of increasing wages and increasing productivity due to
mechanization — which is induced by the same wage increases — forms
the core of the impressive growth of the developed economies since the
1850s. This is the same type of self-reinforcing mechanism described by
Serra as regards increasing returns and increased exports from Venice:
because increased volumes of production lead to lowered cost and lowered
prices, even more customers come, which again lowers prices (and barriers
to entry we would add today) even more — cumulatively ‘one factor rein-
forces the other’ as Serra says (Serra 2009, Chapter 10).     
The existence of increasing returns — of falling costs of production as vol-
ume increases — was implicitly recognized in conscious industrial policy as
far back as in 1485 (Reinert 2007). As already referred to, in 1923 US
economist Frank Graham showed how — under international specialization
— nations specializing in increasing returns activities (manufacturing indus-
try) would grow richer while nations specializing in diminishing return activ-
ities (raw material) would grow poorer (Appendix I). In other words, some
nations would specialize in being rich, while other nations would specialize
in being poor. 
Unfortunately when Paul Krugman, partly inspired by Frank Graham’s 1923
article, started ‘New Trade Theory’ (Krugman 1990) he soon left out the
18diminishing returns side of the argument. This contributed seriously to the
‘free trade overshooting’ that we have experienced: for all practical pur-
poses only the good news about scale and trade, increasing returns, were
included in New Trade Theory, while the bad news, diminishing returns,
were left out.    
7. Increasing Returns and Synergies: their Creation and their 
Destruction 
In many ways, the United States can be seen as the prototype successful
developmental state. After the US independence, the Continental European
understanding of development as synergies between a large number of
increasing returns industries was partly transferred from European literature
and partly rediscovered by US economists. These economists insisted that
the United States, in spite its abundance of natural resources and obvious
comparative advantage in agriculture, would grow poor without a manu-
facturing industry (Hamilton 1791, Raymond 1820, M. Carey 1721). Later,
along the same line of reasoning, Henry Carey (1793–1879) insisted that
trading too much with Britain would preclude the United States from enjoy-
ing the bounties of future technological change. Carey also devised what
he called a ‘commodity map’ which illustrates how the presence of a man-
ufacturing sector changes the way income is distributed within a nation.
Carey’s map, which could also have been called a ‘development synergy
map, is an illustration of the centuries-old observation of the effects of a
manufacturing sector. Today the map can be used in explaining the mech-
anisms by which the Washington Consensus policies created increasing
poverty in the world periphery.   
Figure 3. Henry Carey’s ‘Commodity Map’ (1858)
19The graph in Figure 3 represents the breakdown of a typical dollar’s worth
of goods, i.e., a proxy for what we today would call GDP. The height of the
graph represents 100 per cent of GDP. Carey shows how different the com-
position of GDP is in the developed East compared to the undeveloped West
of the United States at the time, this graph tells a story of how the com-
position of GDP would change as one moved gradually from Boston to St.
Louis — from right to left in the figure — or vice versa. Economic develop-
ment — increasing division of labour and manufacturing — is represented
by moving east from St. Louis, Missouri towards Boston. Primitivization and
de-industrialization are represented by travelling west, from Boston to St.
Louis.   
The West, St. Louis, thus represents the situation in the undeveloped world
periphery today. Here raw materials — e.g., cotton or cattle — are pro-
duced; land is abundant and cheap, labour is unskilled and cheap, the tasks
are simple, and the division of labour is very limited. Under such conditions,
Carey says, profits take up a large share of the GDP.
The East, Boston, represents today’s developed world with a large division
of labour that has added a lot of value to a raw material base. Here in the
East, in contrast to the underdeveloped West, a multitude of workers com-
bine their efforts within a refined social division of labour to work raw mate-
rials up into ever more refined products. More skills are required, increasing
returns create higher profits and higher barriers to entry. Here wages and
rents form a much larger portion of the value of products, while profits
shrink to a smaller percentage of GDP. 
If a nation over time should travel west from Boston to St. Louis, that
means undoing the synergies of development, reversing the critical mass
that creates wealth, in a sense travelling from capitalism back in time
towards feudalism. This more than 150 year old graph can be used to show
how the Washington Consensus policies that started in the late 1970s have
produced exactly the same effect as Henry Carey claims a trip from Boston
to St. Louis would have done in 1858: wages as a percentage of GDP sank
slowly, while rents and profits — the FIRE sector: finance, insurance and
real estate — grew correspondingly. 
‘Market failure’ is a term often used when empirical facts fail to behave the
way economic theory would predict. In their path-breaking new volume on
industrial policy, the editors Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2009) emphasize that
‘market failure’ is not a constructive angle from which one should approach
the problem of poverty. In fact, from a Schumpeterian angle, what we gen-
erally refer to as ‘development’ is in fact a ‘market failure’ compared to the
standard neo-classical model assuming perfect competition and diminishing
20returns. What all developed countries have in common is a large increasing
returns sector that has created huge barriers to entry, imperfect competi-
tion, and a ‘rent’ that has been divided between capitalists (high profits),
labour (high wages), and the government sector (larger tax base) (Reinert
2009a). In this section we shall see how the policies of the Washington
Institutions lead to the destruction of these industrial rents, and to a huge
fall in real wages. The shock therapies of the Washington Institutions —
instant free trade and ‘structural adjustments’ — brought the poor countries
whose industrial sectors were not yet competitive on the world market on
a permanent trip ‘from Boston to St. Louis’ in Carey’s scheme. 
Looking at Carey’s mechanisms through the example of Peru, it is possible
to observe how, since 1950, waves of industrialization and de-industrial-
ization have been associated with fluctuations of living standards. The stan-
dard of living of the population has been inversely related to the weight of
primary sector in the total economy. During the period 1950 to 1997, a one
percentage point decrease in manufacturing industry as a percentage of
GDP led to a fall in white-collar wages by 5.4 per cent, and a fall in blue-
collar wages by 7.5 per cent. In reverse, every time manufacturing indus-
try increased by one percentage point in total GDP, white-collar and blue-
collar real wages increased by 10.6 and 15.5 per cent respectively (Roca
and Simabuko 2004). Going back to Carey’s map, we can conclude that
every time manufacturing increased as a percentage of GDP, this corre-
sponding to ‘moving east’ on the Carey map: wages went up. Every time
the manufacturing sector shrank, it corresponded to ‘moving west’ on the
Carey map: wages went down.   
Figure 4 shows how real wages in Peru peaked in the mid-1970s when the
country did everything ‘wrong’ according to the Washington Consensus.
Peruvian industry was kept up by high tariffs and it represented a ‘bad’ form
of protection. Industrialization was ‘artificial’, but the wages, roads,
schools, and hospitals that were created by this industrialization were all
real. It is also extremely important to see how exports take off and make
the country look very successful while, at the same time, real wages are
plummeting. The Washington Consensus shock therapy hit Peru on two
fronts simultaneously: de-industrialization plus downsizing the public sector.
By killing off the two sectors with strong union power — one private, one
public — the whole national wage level collapsed. This was accompanied
by a rapid fall in the Terms of Trade (Reinert 2007, Figure 15).
21Figure 4. Industrialization, deindustrialization and real wages in Peru
Source: Reinert 2007.
Peruvian wage levels fell much faster than GDP, which can only mean that
the composition of Peruvian GDP must have changed dramatically. Figure
5 in fact shows how dramatic this effect was. At the height of the indus-
trial age in Peru, in 1972, wages amounted to 51.2 per cent of GDP and
the income of the self-employed to 26.5 per cent, a total of 77.7 per cent
of GDP. Figure 5 shows how wages, salaries and the income of the self-
employed shrank rapidly as the country prematurely opened up to free
trade. In 1990, the last year the Peruvian Central Bank provided a break-
down of GDP in this way, the share of wages in GDP had almost been
halved, to 26.5 per cent, and the share of the income of the self-employed
had fallen to 15.9 per cent. In total, ‘normal people’s’ share of GDP —
wages, salaries and income of the self-employed — had shrunk by 45 per
cent, from 77.7%  to 42.4% of GDP as a result of Washington Consensus
policies from the mid-1970s to 1990. The ‘national industrial rent’ had been
destroyed, with devastating results for real wages that, in real terms, had
been more than halved in real terms.
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Figure 5. Peru: Deindustrialization and falling wages as a percentage of GDP, 1950-
1990
Legend (from top): profits, predial (tax), income of the self-employed, wages 
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. This breakdown of GDP by source was not published
after 1990.  
Abrupt free trade led to rapidly falling real wages and a serious maldistrib-
ution of income, a primitivization of the economy back to a more feudal
structure, corresponding to a voyage from developed Boston to underde-
veloped St. Louis in Henry Carey’s model. This shows how the presence of
a manufacturing sector changes the structural fibre of an economy, why a
poor nation is much better off with a relatively inefficient manufacturing
sector than with no manufacturing sector at all. This is the age-old lesson
that now has been unlearned. 
John Maynard Keynes, then, was not only right about world financial
crises, his advice to poor peripheral countries at the time, in the early
1930s, is the same advice we should give poor countries today, adapted to
the present technological context. Note also that Keynes, based on the first
period of globalization, recommends a certain measure of de-globalization in
order to promote peace: 
I sympathize, therefore, with those who would minimize, rather
than with those who would maximize, economic entanglement 
among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel —
these are the things which should of their nature be international.
But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conve-niently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national.
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Yet, at the same time, those who seek to disembarrass a country 
of its entanglements should be very slow and wary. It should not
be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to 
grow in a different direction.
For these strong reasons, therefore, I am inclined to the belief that,
after the transition is accomplished, a greater measure of national
self-sufficiency and economic isolation among countries than
existed in 1914 may tend to serve the cause of peace, rather than
otherwise. At any rate, the age of economic internationalism was
not particularly successful in avoiding war; and if its friends retort,
that the imperfection of its success never gave it a fair chance, it
is reasonable to point out that a greater success is scarcely pro-
bable in the coming years (Keynes 1933/1972).
In the same 1933 paper Keynes tells us how his view on free trade
changed:
I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not
only as an economic doctrine which a rational and instructed per-
son could not doubt, but almost as a part of the moral law. I
regarded ordinary departures from it as being at the same time an 
imbecility and an outrage. I thought England’s unshakable free
trade convictions, maintained for nearly a hundred years, to be
both the explanation before man and the justification before
Heaven of her economic supremacy. As lately as 1923 I was wri-
ting that free trade was based on fundamental ‘truths’ which,
stated with their due qualifications, no one can dispute who is 
capable of understanding the meaning of the words.
… [M]ainly I attribute my change of outlook to … my hopes and
fears and preoccupations, along with those of many or most, I 
believe, of this generation throughout the world, being different 
from what they were. It is a long business to shuffle out of the men-
tal habits of the prewar nineteenth-century world. It is astonishing 
what a bundle of obsolete habiliments one’s mind drags round even
after the centre of consciousness has been shifted. But to-day at 
last, one-third of the way through the twentieth century, we are
most of us escaping from the nineteenth; and by the time we reach
its mid point, it may be that our habits of mind and what we care
about will be as different from nineteenth-century methods and valu-
es as each other century’s has been from its pre decessor’s.
It is my conviction that a new generation — particularly in the Third World
— soon will come to look at late twentieth century truths in the same way
24
vii This ‘vision’ was later elaborated upon by the classical development economists (see Nurkse 2009
and Kattel, Kregel, and Reinert [eds.] 2009).Keynes looked at those of the nineteenth century: ‘It is astonishing what a
bundle of obsolete habiliments one’s mind drags round even after the cen-
tre of consciousness has been shifted’. The Increasing distance =
Increasing Abstraction Theorem has evidenced the risk that the present
financial crisis may create a shift in ‘the centre of consciousness’ as regards
economic practices in the developed world, while the policies towards the
Third World may continue to be guided by the same ‘obsolete habiliments’
inherited from the Washington Consensus principles.  
Conclusion: Towards ‘an 1848 Moment’ when Empirical Knowledge
Matters Again 
‘You don’t get dramatic change, or reform, or action unless there is a cri-
sis’, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson recently said, commenting on
the financial crisis.
viii In the clear light of hindsight, many economists’ han-
dling of the financial crisis show ‘financial illiteracy’ as one actor remarked.
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The growing list of fragile, failing and failed states (FFFs) testifies to the fact
that that poor nations have long been in crisis. However, persistent but
completely untruthful rhetoric claiming the relative successes of China and
India as a result of free trade — rather than of half a century of heavy-hand-
ed industrial policy — has effectively obliterated the miserable economic
performance of most of the rest of the poor world.    
The financial crisis will bring reform, but the ‘developmental illiteracy’ that
has dominated in parallel to the ‘financial illiteracy’ also urgently needs
addressing. Huge subsidies in the form of cash transfers timely saved the
financial cores of capitalism against their own mistakes, now it is time to
save the true victims of the market — the world poor — from the same type
of mistakes, imposed on them by others. At the core of both problems —
financial crisis and persistent poverty — is a mistaken theory claiming that
markets are by nature harmony-creating. However, centuries of experience
show that ‘efficient markets’ produce ‘spontaneous chaos’ just as fre-
quently as they produce ‘spontaneous order’, and that ‘destructive destruc-
tion’ perhaps is as frequent an outcome as ‘creative destruction’. Both in
financial markets and in the international markets for goods and services,
order and progress are always achieved through wise policies in a perspec-
tive that sees the market as a tool rather than as a goal.
We have mentioned the time of the French Revolution and the late 1840s
as two periods when the view of the economy as a harmony-making
machinery has swiftly shifted to one where markets are potentially a chaos-
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viii New York Times, December 26, 2008.
ix Financial Times, December 24, 2008, p. 1. producing machinery. 1846 marked the Repeal of the Corn Laws and the
peak influence of David Ricardo’s economic theory. A deep financial crisis
in 1847 marked a turning point, followed in 1848 by revolutions in all large
European countries with the exception of England and Russia. 
1848 produced three important books that were all critical of the econom-
ic order created by Ricardian economics: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’
Communist Manifesto, which was so radical that Marx was forced to flee
Germany to England, Bruno Hildebrand’s National Economics in the Present
and in the Future, which was so liberal that Hildebrand had to flee Germany
to Switzerland, and John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy. From
completely different political angles all three books attacked the mainstream
of the day for suffering from the same weaknesses of which we accuse
today’s mainstream. By attempting to make economics into a much more
accurate science than it merits, the mainstream has created economic dis-
asters: both financial crisis and peripheral poverty. All three 1848 books
understood that national wealth required industrialization, recanting
Ricardo’s trade theory, the very same theory which presently — in its most
simplistic form — forms the basis of the world economic order that locks
poor nations into a comparative advantage of being poor. Table 1 illustrates
the kind of shift in economic focus that is likely to result from the present
‘1848 moment’ precipitated by the financial crisis. 
John Stuart Mill — today celebrated as an important liberal (in the European
sense) — admitted that poor nations needed a manufacturing industry and
therefore recommended ‘infant industry protection’. In a speech to Belgian
workers in 1848 Karl Marx was pleased with Ricardo’s free trade theory
because premature free trade would create poverty and hasten revolution.
It is entirely possible that warlords in the world periphery appreciate free
trade for the same reason Marx did: premature free trade locks a nation into
a pre-capitalistic (‘feudal’) structure that prevents democracy. A nation
without a fine web of increasing returns industries is unlikely to be able to
support a democratic system. Enlightenment economists and philosophers
were extremely aware of the fact that increasing returns/industrialization
and democracy go hand in hand. As Toqueville puts it: ‘I do not know if one
can cite a single manufacturing and commercial nation, from the Tyrians
(Phoenicians) to the Florentines and the English, that has not also been free.
Therefore a close tie and a necessary relation exist between those two
things: freedom and industry’ (quoted in Reinert 2007).
John Stuart Mill not only rediscovered the reasons for ‘infant industry pro-
tection’, he also thoroughly understood that at the core of all widespread
poverty lies the curse of diminishing returns:
I apprehend (the elimination of this factor) to be not only an error,
but the most serious one, to be found in the whole field of politi-
26cal economy. The question is more important and fundamental 
than any other; it involves the whole subject of the causes of po-
verty; ... and unless this one matter be thoroughly understood, it 
is to no purpose proceeding any further in our inquiry (Mill 
1848/1987: 176).    
Mill also describes the collective wake-up call when an inappropriate type
of theory is left behind, what I call the 1848 moment: 
It often happens that the universal beliefs of one age of mankind
— a belief from which no one was, nor without an extraordinary 
effort of genius and courage could at the time be free — becomes 
to a subsequent age so palpable an absurdity, that the only diffi-
culty then is to imagine how such a thing can ever have appeared 
credible... It looks like one of the crude fancies of childhood, 
instantly corrected by a word from any grown person. (Mill
1848/1987: 3). 
The one single message in this paper is that the only way to create middle
income countries is to create countries with a large division of labour in
increasing returns sectors: countries with a manufacturing sector (and
today with advanced services). Diversification away from the primary sec-
tor and the creation of employment must be given priority before free trade.
This has been the basis of all successful developmental practice since the
late 1400s and in theory since 1613. At times this principle gets sup-
pressed by excessively abstract economic theories — at the time of the
French Revolution, in the 1840s, around 1930, and since the late 1970s —
but empirically based theories eventually come back, precipitated by eco-
nomic crises.
The Marshall Plan following World War II was the most successful devel-
opment plan in the history of mankind. The 1948 Havana Charter — at the
time approved by all members of the United Nations — was based on the
principles of John Stuart Mill and of the Marshall Plan. A blueprint for devel-
opment of peripheral states exists in the Havana Charter, and a key factor
is the timing of free trade. Policies that create and nurture increasing returns
sectors in poor countries are needed, and the discussion on how and when
to turn on and off will be as heated as it has always been. When success-
fully promoted — as it was in the United States — protection carries the
seed of its own destruction: having achieved a certain size and skill level,
the protected companies themselves seek out larger markets in order to
stay competitive. History does not supply easy formulas, but at least shows
us some very important principles that, through the Washington
Consensus, have been ignored far too long.                                          
2728
Table 1. The Coming Shift in Economic Focus: Before and after the 1848 Moment
PRE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOCUS  POST FINANCIAL CRISIS FOCUS 
Capital  Technology and entrepreneurship 
Financial economy  Real economy 
International trade  National production 
Economic models  Economic facts and their contexts 
Distribute capital (‘aid’) in order to 
eradicate poverty 
Distribute production in order to eradicate 
poverty 
Perfect competition   Poverty eradication needs the high wages 
and the capital formation that only dynamic 
imperfect competition creates 
Economics strongly ideologically biased. 
The Cold War polarization maintained: 
markets are good and the state bad and 
vice-versa.   
Separation of analysis and ideology, 
‘technocratic’ analysis 
Economic activities qualitatively alike  Economic activities qualitatively different 
Gross national product/capita  Real wages 
Economics as a science defined as the use 
of certain tools 
Economists’ toolbox extended any 
approach which is relevant.   
The market as an ideological goal   The market as a tool for wealth creation  
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Man- Output per Total Man- Output per   Total
days man-day days man-day
Appendix I. Frank Graham’s Theory of Uneven Development
Increasing and diminishing returns in international trade: a numerical example
Stage 1: World income and its distribution before trade
Product Country A Country B
Wheat 200 4 800 200 4 800
Watches   200 4 800 200 3 600
World production: 1,600 wheat + 1,400 watches. In wheat equivalents: 3,200
Country A’s income in wheat equivalents: 1,714 wheat
Country B’s income in wheat equivalents: 1,486 wheat
Price: 4 wheat = 3.5 watches
Man- Output per Total Man- Output per   Total
days man-day days man-day
Stage 2: World income and its distribution after each country specializes
according to its comparative advantage
Product Country A Country B
Wheat 100 4.5 450 300 3.5        1050
Watches   300 4.5 1350 100 2 200
World production with trade: 1,500 wheat + 1,550 watches. In wheat equivalents: 3,271
Country A’s income in wheat equivalents: 1,993 wheat
Country B’s income in wheat equivalents: 1,278 wheat33 33
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